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Articles
DO "CREATURES OF THE STATE" HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS?: STANDING FOR MUNICIPALITIES TO ASSERT
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE
MICHAEL A. LAWRENCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
W HEN it comes to constitutional rights vis-d-vis their creating states,
municipal corporations and other political subdivisions get little or
no respect. It has been said, for example, that the nature of the relation-
ship between a municipal corporation and its creating state is such that
the municipal corporation "cannot invoke the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment" and other constitutional provisions against the state.'
The principle behind the limited power of municipalities is that "[b]eing
but creatures of the State, municipal corporations have no standing to
invoke the contract clause or the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution in opposition to the will of their creator. '2 State
court precedent supports this basic proposition, with most state courts uni-
formly denying municipal corporations any constitutional protection vis-a-
vis their creating states.
3
This Article rejects the proposition that municipal corporations are
completely lacking in constitutional rights vis-d-vis their creating states. In-
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Michigan State University Detroit
College of Law; J.D., M.S., University of Wisconsin Law School. The author would
like to thank Professor Fred Cheever of the University of Denver College of Law
for his helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the able research
assistance of John Coronado.
1. City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923).
2. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939) (footnote omitted); see also
City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 189 (1923) (holding that Just Com-
pensation Clause offers no bar to state's attempts to modify grant or charter it had
previously given to city); City of Newark, 262 U.S. at 196 (stating that municipal
corporation "cannot invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment" and
other constitutional provisions against its own state); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,
207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (stating that municipality cannot assert Contract
Clause as bar to state's efforts to alter municipality's boundaries); E. B. Schulz, The
Effect of the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment upon the Power of the States to
Control Municipal Corporations, 36 MICH. L. REV. 385, 396-97 (1938) ("[Tlhe con-
tract, due process, and equal protection clauses of the national Constitution afford
no protection whatever to municipal corporations, in their own right, as against the
power of the states to control them.").
3. See I EUGENE MCQuILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.21
(John H. Silvestri & Mark S. Nelson eds., 3d ed. 1999) ("Unless restricted by the
state constitution, the state legislature has plenary power to create, alter, or abolish
at pleasure any or all local government areas.").
(93)
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stead this Article argues that in this context these "creatures of the state"
do, in fact, possess at least some constitutional rights. The proposition
that a municipal corporation never has standing to invoke the protection
of the Constitution against its own state is belied by the United States Su-
preme Court's suggestion in Gomillion v. Lightfoot4 that "[l]egislative con-
trol of municipalities, no less than any other state power, lies within the
scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution."5
With this statement, the Court implicitly recognized the possibility that a
municipal corporation may indeed possess standing to assert that its creat-
ing state has exceeded constitutional limits while dealing with the munici-
pality. In addition, other state and federal cases bolster the proposition
that states' power over their municipal corporations is limited in some re-
spects by the Constitution. 6
This Article describes the current parameters of municipal corpora-
tion standing, particularly in view of the emergence of a more fully-devel-
oped procedural due process jurisprudence during the last decades of the
twentieth century. Next, this Article provides a careful examination of fed-
eral and state precedent involving standing for municipal corporations to
assert claims against their creating states, together with a review of the
Court's current procedural due process doctrine. Finally, this Article con-
cludes that municipal corporations have standing to assert certain proce-
dural due process claims against the states that created them, even though
they likely do not have standing to assert other claims, including those
involving substantive matters of the state's internal political organization. 7
To the extent that the federal and state judiciaries have failed to draw an
explicit distinction between procedural and substantive due process in this
4. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
5. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344-45.
6. See, e.g., At. Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freehold-
ers At. County, 893 F. Supp. 301, 315 (D.N.J. 1995) ("[M]unicipalities may assert
claims against the creating state under the Supremacy Clause, but not under other
substantive constitutional guarantees."); Shirk v. City of Lancaster, 169 A. 557, 560
(Pa. 1933) ("[R]evenues derived in [a municipal corporation's] private capacity, as
a return from its water or other utility works, are tnst funds, and cannot be con-
trolled or taken directly for state purposes.").
From an early date, the United States Supreme Court "noticed" the distinc-
tion between property held by a municipal corporation in its governmental capac-
ity versus its private, proprietary capacity, and broached the possibility that there
may be circumstances when the city might have a fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess claim against the state for the deprivation of property held in the latter capac-
ity. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 179-80. For a further discussion of limitations on state
power, see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
7. This Article asserts that municipal corporations have standing to assert pro-
cedural due process claims against their creating states for the deprivation of cer-
tain liberty and property interests that do not involve substantive matters of the
state's internal political organization. The additional issue of the possibility of
state sovereign immunity for such an action through the Eleventh Amendment
and individual state constitutional provisions, while critical, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
[Vol. 47: p. 93
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context, principles of fundamental fairness and doctrinal consistency sug-
gest they should begin to do so.8
Section II describes the contours of the state/municipal corporation
relationship.9 Section III examines the limits of state supremacy by review-
ing the Supreme Court's procedural due process doctrine in the context
of municipal corporation standing, and then by analyzing judicial prece-
dent concerning municipal corporation standing.10 Finally, Section IV
briefly reiterates the assertion that Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process protections do indeed extend to municipalities in some
circumstances.t 1
8. For a discussion of why courts should draw a distinction between procedu-
ral and substantive due process, see infra note 58 and accompanying text. In the
end, because so many aspects of state-local relations do involve "substantive matters
of internal political organization," likely it will be the unusual case where the mu-
nicipality would be able to maintain standing under the theory espoused in this
Article. Moreover, even accepting this Article's premise that municipalities have
standing to assert procedural due process claims against their creating states in
cases not involving substantive matters of the state's internal political organization,
it may well be the case that the procedural due process requirements of notice and
adequate hearing are sometimes met through the state's legislative process itself,
thus defeating the municipality's procedural due process claim. For a further dis-
cussion of the role of legislation in this issue, see infra notes 94-95 and accompany-
ing text.
The importance of this Article's fundamental arguments is not diminished,
however, despite the existence of these possibilities. Principles of fundamental
fairness suggest that there must be some sort of recourse under the federal Consti-
tution for a municipality in a case (though rare) where the state inappropriately
attempts to deprive the municipality of an interest having nothing whatsoever to
do with substantive matters of the state's internal political organization.
It is axiomatic that constitutional doctrine changes over time to accommodate
our increased and evolving understanding of the Constitution, in all of its com-
plexity. One need only look so far as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause for an example supporting the proposition that our understanding of
the Constitution is an evolutionary process: in 1896, the Court held that the gov-
ernment may segregate African Americans from Caucasians provided accommoda-
tions for both races were "equal but separate." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
540 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). The
Court explicitly repudiated that viewpoint half a century later in Brown v. Board of
Education. See id. at 494-95 (stating that "in the field of public education the doc-
trine of 'separate but equal' has no place" and that "[a]ny language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected"); see also LAWYER'S WIT & WISDOM 95
(Bruce Nash & Alan Zullo eds., 1995) (quoting Justice William Brennan, who
stated that, "We current justices read the Constitution in the only way we can-as
20th-century Americans").
9. For a discussion of the relationship between states and the municipalities
they create, see infra notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of case law concerning the standing of municipalities, see
infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
11. For the Article's conclusion, see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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II. THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Municipal corporations are creations of the State.12 These corpora-
tions "are usually regarded (in legal theory at least) as subordinate depart-
ments, auxiliaries, or convenient instrumentalities of the state for the
purpose of local or municipal rule." 13 The municipal corporation has
been variously described by state courts as "an arm of the state, a minia-
ture state, an instrumentality of the state, an agency of the state, and the
like." 14
It is clear that, as creations of the sovereign, municipal corporations
are subject to a great deal of control by their creating states. Indeed,
Judge McQuillin posits that "[u]nless restricted by the state constitution,
the state legislature has plenary power to create, alter, or abolish at plea-
sure any or all local governmental areas ... [and] may establish reasona-
ble preconditions to incorporation of local government units."'15
The scope and breadth of the state's power is illustrated by the con-
ventional wisdom regarding municipal corporation ownership of real
property, which posits that the municipality's power "to purchase or other-
wise acquire real property can be questioned only by the state and the
amount of real estate which a municipal corporation may hold is a ques-
tion only for the state."' 6 Implicit in this statement is the proposition that
the state may affirmatively control the municipal corporation's interest in
real estate. It is the state, for example, that possesses the power of eminent
12. See 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 1.20 (discussing kinds of public local
corporations). BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY defines "municipal corporation" as: "a
city, town, or other local political entity formed by charter from the state and hav-
ing the autonomous authority to administer the state's local affairs." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1037 (7th ed. 1999). The preeminent treatise on municipal corpora-
tions describes the variety of municipal corporations:
The areas in which [municipal and] public corporations... operate may
be urban, semi-urban, or rural. The urban or semi-urban areas usually
embrace incorporated cities and towns, or municipal corporations
proper, created for the purpose of local government. The rural areas,
which are commonly quite extensive, generally take the name of county
and township, and are chiefly administrative subdivisions of the state, al-
though they often serve as divisions or districts for other purposes. Unin-
corporated towns, villages, hamlets, or boroughs lie in counties or
townships, where they are usually subject to county or township adminis-
tration. Another class of public local areas created [by the state] for par-
ticular purposes such as drainage, irrigation, reclamation, improvement,
levee, benefit, taxing, etc., districts may also lie in whole or in part in
other governmental areas. However, as these public quasi-corporations
are created for special purposes and have an existence separate and apart
from the areas in which they are situated, they are not, as organs of gov-
ernment, affected by the administration of the area in which they func-
tion, though they may be affected as a practical matter.
1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 1.20 (footnotes omitted).
13. Id. § 1.19 (footnote omitted).
14. i. § 2.08.10 (footnotes omitted).
15. Id. § 1.21.
16. 10 id. § 28.21 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 47: p. 93
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domain, "an inherent attribute of the sovereignty of the state to take or
authorize the taking of any property within itsjurisdiction," 17 regardless of
the fact that the property may be "already devoted to a public use by a
subdivision or agency of that state."' 8 The power of eminent domain is
"unrestricted, and does not emanate from constitution or statute, but is
merely limited thereby." 19 Stated another way, "the power of eminent do-
main is older than the constitutions, it requires no constitutional recogni-
tion, it is not created or granted by constitution or statute, and is without
restriction, except as the people have limited it."20
Of course the people have limited the states' power of eminent do-
main, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, as well as through the constitutions of all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.2 1 Indeed, a number of states have chosen to dele-
17. 11 id. § 32.02 (citing, for example, United States v. Certain Lands in Louis-
ville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), and Campbell v. Chase National Bank, 5 F. Supp.
156 (S.D.N.Y. 1933)).
18. A. S. Klein, Annotation, Power of Eminent Domain as Between State and Subdi-
vision or Agency Thereof or As Between Different Subdivisions or Agencies Themselves, 35
A.L.R.3d 1293 § 3 (1971) (citing People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Los
Angeles, 179 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558 (1960) (holding that all property, including that
already devoted to public use, is held subject to right of state to take and use it for
other public purposes); Welch v. Denver, 349 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1960) (commenting
that state has power to acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, lands of municipal
corporation already devoted to public uses); Bridgie v. Koochiching County, 35
N.W.2d 537 (Minn. 1948) (explaining that legislature has complete control over
property of municipal corporation, which it may take from control of officers of
city and turn over to other state officers under direct supervision and control of
state)).
19. 11 McQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 32.02 (citing, for example, Mississippi &
Rum RiverBoom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878)). Judge McQuillin explains that
the case stands for the proposition that "[o]rganic provisions requiring just com-
pensation for property so taken are a mere limitation on the exercise of the right
and whether the conditions have been observed, is a proper matter for judicial
cognizance." Id. (footnotes omitted).
20. Id. § 32.02 (citing, for example, Mesa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Im-
provement & Power District, 373 P.2d 722 (Ariz. 1962); Greater Hartford Bridge Author-
ity v. Russo, 188 A.2d 874 (Conn. 1963); Forest Preserve District of Du Page County v.
Brookwood Land Venture, 595 N.E.2d 136 (Ill. 1992); In re City of Rochester, 121 N.E.
102 (N.Y. 1918); State v. Superior Court, 149 P. 652 (Wash. 1915)).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation."); U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (making Fifth
Amendment applicable to states by providing that no state may deprive any person
property without due process of law); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898)
(holding that state law deprives common carrier of its property without due pro-
cess if law unreasonably establishes rates for transportation of persons or prop-
erty); Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(finding that Illinois statute violated due process clause by allowing extension of
public street through private rails without compensation); 1 MCQUILLIN, supra
note 3, § 1.21 ("Due to the abuse of [the state's] power, often for partisan politics,
most state organic laws contain restrictions of some sort, especially limitations re-
lating to counties, cities and towns."). Of state constitutions, Judge McQuillin
writes:
5
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gate greater authority to municipal corporations by granting them "home-
rule" status. 22 The purpose of home-rule constitutional provisions is:
[T]o eliminate to some extent the authority of the legislature
over the municipality, and to bestow on the municipalities com-
ing under home rule full power of local self-government as to all
subjects that are strictly of municipal concern, or germane to mu-
nicipal functioning, and not in conflict with the constitution or
applicable general laws .... Depending upon applicable consti-
tutional provisions, a charter adopted under home rule may be-
come the organic law of the municipality and supersede all
general state laws in conflict with it relating to purely municipal
affairs. 23
In contrast to the interpretation of state constitutional and statutory
provisions, historically the judiciary has greatly circumscribed the protec-
tions available to municipal corporations under the United States Consti-
tution. This approach is reflected in Judge McQuillin's treatise: "The due
process clause in the Constitution is of little importance so far as legislative
control of municipal corporations is concerned," due to the notion that
"[in]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created
for exercising any governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to
them and they may not assert the protection of the due process clause
against action of the state government."24
That said, a few, mostly state courts, have extended greater federal
constitutional protections to municipal corporations under certain nar-
rowly defined circumstances. 25 One set of such circumstances involves ac-
After the middle of the 19th century, state constitutions contained nu-
merous provisions, many in much detail, touching local government,
both urban and rural. The constitutions of all states admitted into the
union after that time dealt largely with this subject, and the majority of
the states already in the union revised their constitutions, making provi-
sion, more or less elaborate, affecting local government. Many limita-
tions, expressed and implied, were contained in those constitutional
provisions relating to the powers of the legislature, concerning interfer-
ence with local self-government.
Id.
22. See I MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, §§ 3.21-3.23 (describing creation, purpose
and varying types of home-rule charters).
23. Id. § 3.21.10 (footnotes omitted).
24. 2 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.20 (Den-
nisJensen & Gail A. O'Grady eds., 3d ed. 1996) (citing, as examples of cases that
state that municipalities, as creatures and instruments of state, are without stand-
ing to attack constitutionality of statute on due process grounds, Yonkers Commis-
sion on Human Rights v. City of Yonkers, 654 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Meador v.
Salem, 284 N.E.2d 266 (Il. 1972); Mountlake Terrace v. Wilson, 549 P.2d 497 (Wash.
1976); Associated Hospital Service v. City of Milwaukee, 109 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. 1961));
see City of Hamilton v. Fairfield Twp., 678 N.E.2d 599, 612 (Ohio 1996) (noting
that due process clause does not apply to municipalities).
25. See, e.g., Proprietors of Mt. Hope Cemetery v. City of Boston, 33 N.E. 695,
695 (Mass. 1893) (involving power of state legislature to compel city to transfer
[Vol. 47: p. 93
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knowledging the distinction between property held by a municipal
corporation in its governmental capacity and that held in its private or
proprietary capacity. 2 6 Courts have held, for example, that:
As to the property it... holds for its own private purposes, a city
is to be regarded as a constituent in State government, and is
entitled to the like protection in its property rights as any natural
person who is also a constituent. The right of the State as re-
gards such property, is a right of regulation, and.., is not a right
of appropriation.
27
Accordingly, some courts have concluded that:
Property of the first class is to be regarded as "public" property,
and hence not protected by the constitutional inhibition in ques-
tion, while property of the second class is as much "private" as
property of an individual landowner, with the result that it may
not be taken by another subdivision or agency of the state with-
out payment of just compensation.
28
This approach is epitomized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's direct
statement in Madison Metropolitan Sewerage District v. Committee on Water Pol-
lution.2 9 In that case the court stated that, "the Fourteenth Amendment
• . . applies only to property held by a municipality in its proprietary
capacity."3 0
It is against this backdrop that we might hypothesize whether a partic-
ular municipal corporation (City) enjoys any protection (aside from any
cemetery property held by it to private corporation, and stating that "[the state's]
legislative power of control [over its cities] is not universal and does not extend to
property acquired by a city or town for special purposes, not deemed strictly and
exclusively public and political, but in respect to which a city or town is deemed
rather to have a right of private ownership, of which it cannot be deprived against
its will, save by the right of eminent domain, with payment of compensation"). By
contrast, the Mt. Hope Cemetery court noted that the state may execute significant
control in requiring the city to transfer public property-without compensation-
to some other agency of the state appointed to perform similar or other public
purposes. See id. The United States Supreme Court extended similar protection to
municipal corporations in City of Boston v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 309, 316 (1922), affg
City of Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 130 N.E. 390 (Mass. 1921). The
Court stated that the city's property rights in its street railway system were of a
proprietary nature so that they could not be taken by the state for use by another
state agency without first making reasonable compensation to the city. See id. (ex-
tending due process rights to city).
26. See Mt. Hope Cemetery, 33 N.E. at 695 (distinguishing between city property
held for "special purposes" and that held as public land).
27. People ex rel. Bd. of Park Comm'rs v. Common Council, 28 Mich. 227, 240
(1873).
28. Annotation, Eminent Domain: Power of One Governmental Unit or Agency to
Take Property of Another Such Unit or Agency, 91 L. Ed. 221, 248 (1946).
29. 50 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1951).
30. Madison Metro., 50 N.W.2d at 436 (citing Town of Bell v. Bayfield County,
239 N.W. 503 (Wis. 1931)).
7
Lawrence: Do Creatures of the State Have Constitutional Rights: Standing fo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
applicable state constitutional or statutory provisions, which vary widely)
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in the event that
its creating state (State) seeks to acquire certain of City's real property
(Property). Property is acquired by City on the open market for private
development purposes with funds raised by City from private investors,
whereby City will develop the property into a shopping center. In its pro-
prietary capacity, City plans to engage the services of a private contractor
to build the shopping center and to contract with a management company
to manage the project. City has embarked upon this plan having seen the
success that other cities have had in entering the market with proprietary,
essentially private, enterprises.
State decides that it needs City's Property for a state office building.
It asserts that it need not compensate City or provide any sort of hearing
because City is a "creation of the state," and State thereby "has plenary
power to abolish at [its] pleasure" this particular property interest of
City. 3' For its part, City recognizes that State's power of eminent domain
is broad, and that State may well succeed in acquiring Property, but City
asserts that at the very least State must give City procedural due process
and compensation because State is attempting to take a "property" interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The question is: Does State
need to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and
provide City with procedural due process? While conventional doctrine,
as applied by most courts, might say "No," this Article answers with an
emphatic "Yes."
III. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIMs AGAINST
THEIR CREATING STATES
A. Constitutional Limits on a State's Power over Its Municipal Corporations
The United States Supreme Court addressed the matter of the rela-
tionship between states and their municipalities in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.32
31. 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 1.21. For a discussion of how municipalities
are subject to control by their creating states, see supra notes 12-30 and accompa-
nying text.
32. In Gomillion, the Court considered the validity of an act of the Alabama
legislature that redefined the City of Tuskegee's boundaries in such a way as to
exclude the great majority of African-Americans, while leaving unaffected the
white constituency. See 364 U.S. at 340 (explaining claim of Tuskegee's African-
American residents to enjoin state from enforcing act). The constitutional provi-
sions at issue in Gomillion were the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the latter providing that the right to
vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend.
XV, § 1.
The Court in Gomillion held that the Fifteenth Amendment limits a state's
right to re-draw the boundaries of a municipal corporation in such a way as to limit
the right to vote. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345 (paraphrasing the Fifteenth
Amendment, which forbids states from passing any law that deprives citizen of his
[Vol. 47: p. 93
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It stated that, "the Court has never acknowledged that the States have
power to do as they will with municipal corporations regardless of the con-
sequences. Legislative control of municipalities, no less than any other
state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the
United States Constitution .... ,,33 The Court further held that:
[A] correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter
and kindred cases is not that the State has plenary power to ma-
nipulate in every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose,
the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that the
State's authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of
the Constitution considered in those cases.
34
Gomillion thus sets forth the important principle that there are constitu-
tional limits to the degree of control that may be asserted by a state over
municipal corporations, through legislation or otherwise. - 5 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Gomillion in Rogers v: Brockette,3 6 elabo-
rated upon this point: "[W]e do not think [the cases] hold that a
municipality never has standing to sue the state of which it is a creature." 37
Rather, the Fifth Circuit opined that "Hunter, Trenton, and allied cases are
substantive holdings that the Constitution does not interfere in states' in-
ternal political organization. They are not decisions about a municipal-
ity's standing to sue its state."3
8
vote because of his race); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 633 (1969) (allowing states to retain power to impose reasonable citizenship,
age and residency ballot requirements, while prohibiting states under the equal
protection clause from requiring that residents own or lease taxable property to
vote in elections for school board).
33. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344.
34. Id. at 344-45. In other words, a court must undertake, on a case-by-case
basis, an inquiry into whether a state's action is subject to a "relevant limitation[ ]
imposed by the ...Constitution;" or, by contrast, whether the state's action "is
unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution" at issue. See id.
(discussing that in some circumstances, Constitution restrains state's power).
35. See id. (discussing limitations on state action). The last phrase of the ear-
lier quote from Gomillion, "through legislation or otherwise," raises a key point:
Gomillion has been cited (overbroadly, this Article suggests) for the proposition
that in those cases where a municipal corporation may in fact have standing to
challenge an action of its creating state, the municipality is limited to challenging a
state legislative action. Gomillion suggests otherwise, however: "Legislative control of
municipalities, no less than any other state power, lies within the scope of relevant
limitations imposed by the United States Constitution." Id. In other words, just as
legislative control of municipalities must comply with the limitations set forth
under the Constitution, the exercise of "other state power" over municipalities-
e.g., judicial or executive-must also comply. See id. at 344 (suggesting that all
exercises of state power over municipalities must comply with federal
Constitution).
36. 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979).
37. Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1068.
38. Id. at 1069. The issue in Rogers involved whether a local school district,
which the court likened to a municipal corporation, had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a state statute requiring certain school districts to participate in
9
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The important point to be derived from Rogers, as it interprets Gomil-
lion, is the proposition that a municipality lacks standing to sue the State
when the suit involves substantive matters of the State's authority to struc-
ture its own internal political organization.39 Extrapolating from this pro-
position, when the suit does not involve substantive matters of the State's
internal political organization, municipal corporation standing is not nec-
essarily foreclosed. In other words, the Constitution may, at least poten-
tially, "interfere" in such state activities. 4 °1
Rogers, when combined with Gomillion, which suggests that the Consti-
tution imposes some limitations on state control over municipal corpora-
tions, indicates that there are instances when a municipal corporation has
standing to assert that the state has violated a constitutionally protected
right.4 1 Seen in this light, a more precise reading of Gomillion is that
"Hunter and kindred cases" stand for the more narrow proposition that
"the State's authority [to determine substantive matters of internal politi-
a federal subsidized breakfast program. See id. at 1067 n.19, 1068 (establishing that
local school district is analogous to municipality and then granting standing to
school district) (citing Gomillian, 364 U.S. at 344). The school district objected to
being required by the state to participate in the program, arguing that because the
federal program itself did not require the participation of any state or school dis-
trict, the federal law should prevail under the Supremacy Clause; hence, the dis-
trict should be allowed to choose not to participate. See id. at 1060 (explaining
school district's claim against state). The Fifth Circuit allowed the school district
standing to pursue its claim. See id. at 1060-67 (analyzing reasons why school dis-
trict had standing for its claim against State of Texas); see also Comment, Municipal
Corporation Standing to Sue the State: Rogers v. Brockette, 93 HARV. L. REv. 586, 592
(1980) (asserting that the Hunter line of cases "establish no more than that the
particular constitutional guarantees in question confer no rights upon a municipal
corporation that can be invoked against the state").
Similarly, in San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.
Cal. 1978), aff'd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), the federal district court held that
a local port district, which is analogous to a municipal corporation because it is a
creation of the state, had standing to challenge the constitutionality of state legisla-
tion imposing a curfew on aircraft flights, where federal law had no such rule. See
id. at 290 (stating that "[p]olitical subdivisions can be profoundly affected by state
actions which conflict with federal law"). The court stated that "[t]he Supremacy
Clause does not confer a 'right' on any individual, but it does compose a general
limitation on state power." Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit declared that "[w]hile
there are broad dicta that a political subdivision may never sue its maker on consti-
tutional grounds,... we doubt that the rule is so broad" as to prevent the school
district from bringing suit. Gianturco, 651 F.2d at 1309-10 n.7 (citation omitted).
39. See Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1069 (citing substantive principle that "Constitution
does not interfere in states' internal political organization").
40. See id. at 1070 (indicating that merits of case determine whether or not
Constitution may "interfere" in state activities).
41. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344 (stating that state does not have "plenary
power to manipulate in every conceivable way for every conceivable purpose); Rog-
ers, 588 F.2d at 1070 (defining criteria associated with inquiries into standing as
"the extent of an actual injury and of a genuine case or controversy," and deter-
mining that application of this criteria provides school district, likened to munici-
pal corporation, standing to sue state).
[Vol. 47: p. 93
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cal organization] is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Con-
stitution considered in those cases."
4
This proposition is supported by the Court's early statement in Hunter
itself:
It will be observed that in describing the absolute power of the
State over the property of municipal corporations we have not
extended it beyond the property held and used for governmental
purposes. Such corporations are sometimes authorized to hold
and do hold property for the same purposes that property is held
by private corporations or individuals .... [I] t has been held
that as. to the latter class of property the legislature is not
omnipotent.
43
In the ninety-plus years since Hunter, the careful distinction the Court
drew between property held by a municipal corporation in its governmen-
tal capacity and that held in its private, proprietary capacity has become
blurred, along with the attendant possibility the Court implied that the
city might have a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the
State for the deprivation of property held in the city's private and proprie-
tary capacity.44 This failure is not due to the Court's basic re-thinking of
the principle in the years since Hunter, but rather is due to the fact that the
issue has never since reached the Court in such precise terms as it did in
42. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344. Despite the possibility offered by such a read-
ing of broadly extending due process rights to municipal corporations, this Article
does not attempt to do so. There are serious concerns with perpetuating a revival
of this doctrine for individuals, much less for municipal corporations. Instead, the
Article firmly asserts that when the subject of the suit involves not substantive mat-
ters, but rather the procedure by which the state has deprived the municipality of a
liberty, property or other interest conferred by the state, Congress or the Constitu-
tion (at least insofar as the interest does not involve matters of the state's internal
political organization), the municipal corporation does have standing to sue the
state on procedural due process grounds.
43. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907).
44. The Court stated in Hunter.
If the distinction [between property held by a municipal corporation in
its governmental versus private, proprietary capacity] is recognized it sug-
gests the question whether property of a municipal corporation owned in
its private and proprietary capacity may be taken from it against its will
and without compensation .... [T]he question has never arisen directly
for adjudication in this court. But it and the distinction upon which it is
based has several times been noticed [by the Court].
Id. at 179-80 (citations omitted). The City of Allegheny failed to argue at trial that
it held the property at issue in a private and proprietary capacity. See id. at 180
(noting that such argument did not appear in record and did not appear to be
supported by facts). Therefore, the court did not directly address the constitution-
ality of a state taking municipal land held in a private capacity. See id. (stating that
issue presented to court was "entirely different" from question of taking of pri-
vately-held municipal lands). Implicit in Hunter, however, is the possibility that the
court might have considered Allegheny's claim that it had been deprived of prop-
erty without due process of law, had it been able to accurately allege that the prop-
erty deprived was held by the city in its private and proprietary capacity.
11
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Hunter, and the lower federal courts for their part have never adequately
considered the question. 45
For example, the Sixth Circuit in South Macomb Disposal Authority v.
Township of Washington,46 stated in dicta that "a municipal corporation, in
its own right, receives no protection from the Equal Protection or Due
Process Clauses vis-a-vis its creating state."47 This Article submits that for
two reasons South Macomb overgeneralizes the issue. First, South Macomb
fails to distinguish between substantive due process and procedural due
process. Second, this case fails to distinguish between matters involving a
state's internal political organization and those which do not, such as
property held by the municipality in its private and proprietary capacity.
While it appears that municipal corporations lack standing to chal-
lenge state activities involving substantive matters of internal political or-
ganization, the question of whether a municipality has standing to pursue
procedural claims not involving matters of internal political organization is
not clear. 48 Neither the Supreme Court nor any other federal court has
45. See, e.g., S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d
500, 501 (6th Cir. 1986) (considering question of whether political subdivisions of
states can challenge constitutionality of another political subdivision's ordinance
on due process and equal protection grounds).
46. 790 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1986).
47. S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 505. South Macomb involved a lawsuit against a
township by a municipal corporation whose purpose was to dispose of solid waste,
alleging that the conditions the township imposed for a soil removal permit vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 501 (considering municipal corpora-
tion's argument that conditions were not requirements under zoning ordinance
and were imposed out of animosity, and that no other "similarly situated land-
owner" was required to meet such conditions). Stating that "a political subdivision
of a state cannot challenge the constitutionality of another political subdivision's
ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds" for the same reasons as a
political subdivision receives no protection vis-d-vis its creating state, the court held
that the municipal corporation lacked standing to pursue its lawsuit. See id. at 505
(discussing court's reasoning for its holding). The court cites numerous cases and
a 1938 Michigan Law Review article in support of its holding. See id. at 505 (quoting
E. B. Schulz, The Effect of the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment upon the
Power of the States to Control Municipal Corporations, 36 MIcd. L. REV. 385, 396-97
(1938) (asserting that "the contract, due process, and equal protection clauses of
the national Constitution afford no protection whatever to municipal corpora-
tions, in their own right, as against the power of the states to control them")).
South Macomb distinguishes Rogers, Gianturco and Gomillion by stating that
"[t]here may be occasions in which a political subdivision is not prevented, by
virtue of its status as a subdivision of the state, from challenging the constitutional-
ity of state legislation," but that the political subdivision categorically may not in-
voke the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 504. As discussed
above, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text, Gomillion does not support this
distinction.
48. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960) ("The respondents
invoke generalities expressing the State's unrestricted power-unlimited, that is by
the United States Constitution-to establish, destroy or reorganize by contraction
or expansion its political subdivisions, to wit, cities, counties, and other local units.
We freely reorganize the breadth and importance of this aspect of the State's polit-
ical power."); see also Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1979)
12
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fully addressed the distinction between procedural and substantive due
process in this context.49 As the Supreme Court cautions:
Particularly in dealing with claims under broad provisions of the
Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive process of
inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations,
based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to
them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant
controlling facts.
50
An examination of the cases cited by South Macomb in support of its
broad conclusion that a municipal corporation receives no protection vis-d-
vis its creating state from the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses
demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit indeed has overgeneralized the rule
concerning municipal corporation standing.5 1 Specifically, in South Ma-
comb the court failed to distinguish between substantive due process and
procedural due process as it related to municipal corporation standing to
challenge matters not affecting the state's internal political organization.
5 2
(citing "decisions [that] are frequently said to establish that a municipality has no
standing to sue the state that created it").
49. The early Hunter case is as close as the Supreme Court has come to dis-
cussing the possibility of procedural due process rights for a municipal corpora-
tion in the face of a state's acting to deprive it of property the city holds "in its
private and proprietary capacity," but the Court did not reach the issue. See
Hunter, 207 U.S. at 180 (stating that "[tihe question has never arisen directly for
adjudication in this court").
50. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 343-44.
51. See S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 505 (citing cases in support of its propositions).
The court conceded that "[t] here may be occasions in which a political subdivision
is not prevented, by virtue of its status as a subdivision of the state, from challeng-
ing the constitutionality of state legislation," but concludes that, otherwise, "a mu-
nicipal corporation, in its own right, receives no protection from the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses vis-a-vis its creating state." Id. The South Macomb
court cited the following cases: City of South Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 449 U.S. 1039, 1041-42 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d
1057 (5th Cir. 1979); San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283
(S.D. Cal. 1978). S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 504-05. Again, this Article suggests that
the South Macomb court mistakenly limits its comment to legislation.
52. See S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 505 (stating that "a municipal corporation in its
own right, receives no protection from the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause
vis-d-vis its creating state"). All of the cases cited by the court deal fundamentally
with the state's power to control the substance of the state's internal political or-
ganization and power vis-di-vis the municipal corporation. See id. at 504-05 (citing
City of S. Tahoe, 449 U.S. at 1041-42 (White, J., dissenting); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at
342-47; Rogers, 588 F.2d 1057; Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283). Whether the procedure
by the state in undertaking its action meets constitutional muster either is not at
issue, or is not addressed, by the courts in these cases. See id. at 504 (describing
issue as "actually quite narrow: whether a political subdivision of a state receives
any protection from the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment vis-a-vis another political subdivision of the same state").
Many decisions denying municipal corporations standing involve substantive
matters, and therefore do not affect the standing of municipalities to challenge the
13
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B. Procedural Due Process Analysis
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no
State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... -53 For procedural due process claims, the Due Process
constitutionality of state procedures. In City of Moore v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co., 699 F.2d 507, 511-12 (10th Cir. 1983), for example, the Tenth Circuit
denied the City of Moore standing to challenge the State of Oklahoma's authority
to exempt certain companies from the city's zoning power-i.e., a matter that in-
volves the substance of the state's internal political organization and power with
respect to the city. See id. 511-12 (holding that "political subdivisions of a state lack
standing to challenge the validity of a state statute on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds").
Similarly, in Delta Special School District No. 5 v. State Board of Education, 745 F.2d
532 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eighth Circuit denied standing to a school district to chal-
lenge the State of Arkansas' authority to develop an administrative appeal process
for student school transfers within a school district-a matter which, though "pro-
cedural" in the sense that it involves a state's development of a process for student
appeals within a school district, nonetheless goes to the substance of the state's
internal political organization and power with respect to the municipal corpora-
tion. See id. at 533 (upholding district court's ruling that political subdivisions of
state cannot invoke protection of Fourteenth Amendment against state). Likewise,
the Fifth Circuit, in Appling County v. Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, 621 F.2d
1301 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), held that a county lacked standing to challenge
the state of Georgia's authority to confer tax exemptions on certain companies to
the relative advantage of certain, but not all, counties-i.e., a substantive matter
involving the state's internal political organization. See id. at 1308 (quoting Wil-
liams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 (1933). The Wil-
liants Court stated that, "[a] municipal corporation . . . has no privileges or
immunities under the federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition of
the will of its creator." 289 U.S. at 40, 53.
The Second Circuit weighed in on the matter in City of New York v. Richardson,
473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973), holding that New York City could not challenge the
State of New York's social security financing and reimbursement policies as they
applied to the City. See id. at 929 (citing Williams). That same year, the Second
Circuit denied the City of New York standing to challenge the State of New York's
authority to require AFDC recipients, only in certain municipalities and districts,
to register for training and employment-i.e., substantive matters of internal politi-
cal organization. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1101 (2d Cir. 1973)
(discussing city's lack of standing to assert constitutional claims against its state).
Finally, in the Seventh Circuit, the District Court for the Northern District of Indi-
ana held that Lake County lacked standing to challenge Indiana's legislative
scheme to distribute federal AFDC funds among counties-i.e., once again, a sub-
stantive matter subject to state discretion. See County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of
Lake County v. Stanton, 545 F. Supp. 239, 242-43 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (concluding
that "municipal corporations have repeatedly been denied the right to challenge
state legislation allegedly violative of the federal Constitution") (quoting City of
Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Again, the point to be gleaned from all of these cases is that they ultimately
involve matters concerning the state's authority to structure the substance of the
state's relationship with the municipal corporation-i.e., its authority to set the
substantive parameters of its own "internal political organization." None explicitly
involve the adequacy of the procedure used to deprive a municipal corporation of a
particular property or liberty interest not involving matters of internal political
organization.
53. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
14
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Clause involves a two-step analytical inquiry. First, has the State in some
way deprived a "person" of "life," "liberty" or "property" interests within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause?54 Second (assuming the first
question has been answered in the affirmative), what sort of "process" is
"due"?5
5
The Supreme Court discussed the importance of the distinction be-
tween substantive and procedural due process in Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. Loudermill.1
6
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides
that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-can-
not be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate
procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are dis-
tinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a
mere tautology .... The right to due process "is conferred, not
by [the state's] legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.
While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest
.... it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such
an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural
safeguards."
57
In other words, once it can be said that a person-whether that person is
an individual citizen, a private corporation, or a municipal corporation-
possesses a protectable life, liberty, or property interest, the state no
longer has the discretion to determine the minimum process by which
that interest may be deprived.5 8 Rather, the Constitution determines the
minimum process that will be due.5 9 The Court has stated that at a mini-
mum, "the fundamental [constitutional] requirement of due process is
the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
' "60
manner.
54. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (pro-
viding clear holding on Due Process Clause substantive rights).
55. See id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
56. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
57. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.
58. For discussion of a municipal corporation's status as a "person" under the
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text. For discus-
sion of what constitutes a "property interest" for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, see infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
59. See Loudennill 470 U.S. at 541 ("[O]nce it is determined that the Due
Process Clause applies, 'the question remains what process is due.' The answer to
that question is not to be found in the [state] statute.") (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. at 481).
60. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). It follows from Mathews that in order to have a
"meaningful" hearing in a "meaningful manner," it is first necessary to have ade-
quate "notice" of the hearing.
15
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1. A Municipal Corporation Is a "Person" For Purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Most of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the procedural
due process inquiry involves whether the government has deprived an indi-
vidual or a private corporation of a liberty or property interest.6 1 Whether a
municipal corporation, by contrast, qualifies for such protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment has not been squarely addressed by the Supreme
Court, and for their part the lower federal courts have failed to explore
fully the nuances of procedural due process doctrine as it may apply to
municipal corporations. 62
To proceed to an analysis of whether a municipality in a particular
case has been denied procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is necessary to ask the preliminary threshold question
whether a municipality is a "person" for purposes of the Due Process
Clause. It is well-settled that "[a] private corporation is clearly a 'person'
within the meaning of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses," but
from a very early date the Supreme Court has questioned whether a public
corporation is entitled to the same protections as a private corporation. 63
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,64 Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained that a state's power to regulate a private corporation is limited by
the Constitution, whereas the Constitution does not act as a bar for the
state's regulation of its own public corporations, even though the two cor-
porations may provide identical services.6 5
61. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (stating that
African-American petitioners alleged that Alabama act redefining city boundaries
violated Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of Fourteenth Amendment);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (stating that
petitioners, residents of school district, alleged that state's requirement that they
own or lease taxable property to vote in election for school board violated their
rights under Constitution's Equal Protection Clause).
The nature of the interests at stake in these cases vary. They may be real
property, as in takings cases, or life/liberty/property interests created by, and/or
guaranteed by, statutory entitlement or by the Constitution. See, e.g., Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that welfare recipient's interest in contin-
ued receipt of welfare benefits was "statutory entitlement" that amounted to "prop-
erty" within meaning of Due Process Clause).
62. See, e.g., Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1999) (cit-
ing Supreme Court and lower court cases addressing municipality's standing to sue
state). For a further discussion of lower court cases, see supra note 38 and accom-
panying text.
63. S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 503
(6th Cir. 1986) (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936)) (em-
phasis added).
64. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
65. See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 589, n.(c) (distinguishing be-
tween legislature's power regarding private corporations and its power regarding
public corporation). Dartmouth College involved a successful Contract Clause chal-
lenge to a New Hampshire law that changed Dartmouth College from a private to
a public institution. See id. at 666 (finding law changing charter to be unconstitu-
tional). Dartmouth College is a pre-Civil War case, of course, and the Fourteenth
[Vol. 47: p. 93
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That said, lower federal courts have acknowledged that under certain
circumstances municipal corporations may be considered "persons" under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Township of River Vale v. Town of Orange-
town,66 the Second Circuit treated a New Jersey township as a person
under the Due Process Clause when it held that the township had standing
to assert a claim against a town in the neighboring state of New York for
damages caused to the township by that town's zoning change. 67 When a
case involves a claim by a municipal corporation against another state or
one of the other state's local units, as was the case in Township of River Vale,
it is unquestioned that "the broad supremacy doctrine [of states over their
local governments] is not apposite."68
This Article submits that "the broad supremacy doctrine"69 of states
over their local governments is similarly "not apposite" with regard to the
Amendment had not yet been created and ratified. Together with the other "Civil
War Amendments" (the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), the Fourteenth
Amendment marked a "fundamental realignment of federal and state power,"
whereby "[i]nstead of viewing the Constitution as a protection from federal power
and the states as a bulwark against federal interference, at least some people came
to see constitutional rights as a basis for the assertion of federal power to protect
individuals against state interference." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 495-96, 506 (3d ed. 1996). Notions of states being required to afford persons
due process-both substantive and procedural-were decades in the future at the
time Dartmouth College was decided in 1819. Nonetheless, Dartmouth College stands
as precedent to the extent that a state's power to regulate private corporations is
limited by the Constitution, whereas the Constitution does not act as a bar for the
state's substantive regulation of its own internal political organization (including
the "organization" of municipal corporations). See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 561 (discussing various sorts of corporations and varying levels of con-
trol state exercises over them).
66. 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968).
67. See River Vale, 403 F.2d at 686 (1968) (holding that municipal corporation
is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection).
68. JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 52 (2d rev. ed. 1986).
While cases supporting this proposition suggest the existence of limits on a state's
power over its municipal corporations, they cannot be cited as direct authority in
support of municipal corporation standing because most of these cases involve
individual citizens bringing suit to allege deprivations of their own individual liber-
ties. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) (stating the "legis-
lative control of municipalities, no less than any other state power, lies within the
scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution"); Kramer
v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (prohibiting states under
Equal Protection Clause from requiring residents to lease or own taxable property
to vote in school board elections).
69. FORDHAM, supra note 68, at 52; see City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.
192, 196 (1923) ("The enforcement by the State of the provision of the act impos-
ing upon the City the specified annual payments for such diversion of water does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The regu-
lation of municipalities is a matter peculiarly within the domain of the state."). A
fundamental proposition of the "state supremacy" principle is that a "State may
withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges [from a public corporation] as
it sees fit." City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923).
17
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local governments' procedural due process claims. 7°1 Using our hypotheti-
cal as an example, where City acquires certain Property on the open mar-
ket for private development purposes with funds raised from private
investors, City has acquired and holds Property in a manner that is totally
independent of its relationship with State. 7 1 In this instance, City essen-
tially has taken on the characteristics of an individual "person" who would
otherwise be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were it not a mu-
nicipal corporation. There is no principled reason not to extend constitu-
tional procedural due process protections to City when State attempts to
take Property for its own use, thereby depriving City of its proprietary
property interest.
Most states and their legislatures have given effect to this assertion, at
least implicitly, through the enactment of various constitutional and statu-
tory provisions; and a number of state courts have likewise given effect to
the proposition by requiring that states compensate cities for the taking of
certain types of proprietary property from cities. 72 Moreover, at least one
state court has recognized the very principle proposed in this Article-
namely, that municipal governments should have standing to assert proce-
dural due process claims against their creating states.73 In a 1994 case, the
Colorado Court of Appeals stated in dicta that, "[i]n contrast [to a ban on
asserting substantive due process claims], municipal corporations are not
barred from asserting procedural due process claims." 74
70. It is this Article's position that a state certainly may "withhold, grant or
withdraw [some] powers and privileges" from a municipal corporation as it sees fit,
but when a state attempts to withdraw interests having nothing to do with substan-
tive matters of the state's internal political organization, the state must comply with
procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Trenton, 262
U.S. at 187.
71. For the establishment of the hypothetical, see supra note 31 and accompa-
nying text.
72. For a discussion of self-imposed limits on states' power to interfere with
local government, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
73. See City of Colorado Springs v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the County of Eagle,
895 P.2d 1105, 1119 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (distinguishing between substantive and
procedural due process claims by municipalities). Colorado Springs involved cities
in Colorado that applied to the Board of County Commissioners for a special use
permit to conduct a major extension of an existing water collection system and a
permit to conduct a municipal water project, pursuant to the Land Use Act and
other land use regulations. See id. at 1109 (referring to City of Aurora and City of
Colorado Springs as "the cities"). The Board denied the permits, and the cities
filed an action in protest. See id. (noting that "the cities" filed C.R.C.P. 106 action
protesting denial). The trial court ultimately "ordered the Board to approve the
permits because it found that the Board had violated due process by improperly
refusing to consider a final wetlands mitigation report submitted to the Army
Corps of Engineers." Id. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed on this point,
concluding that the "County regulations [were] within the authority granted in
connection with the administration of activities of state interest and [were] not
violative of any constitutional provisions. Thus, the decision of the Board [was]
reinstated." See id. at 1120 (citing Ross v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 713 P.2d
1304 (Colo. 1986)).
74. Id. at 1119.
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Stating the proposition another way, once it can be said that the mu-
nicipal corporation has acquired a protectable property or liberty interest
(at least to the extent the interest does not affect matters involving the
state's internal political organization), any effort by the State to deprive
the municipality of that interest will trigger procedural due process protec-
tions. As the Supreme Court has explained, "The right to due process 'is
conferred, not by [the state's] -legislative grace, but by constitutional
guarantee."' 75
2. Municipal Corporations Can Have "Property Interests" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause
To assert a procedural due process claim, a person must successfully
argue the deprivation by the state of a "life, liberty, or property" interest.76
This Article focuses on the "property" aspect of the Due Process Clause,
since property-especially real property-is the more tangible and certain
of the "liberty" and "property" interests. 77 It is undisputed that real prop-
erty is "property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and that
any deprivation by the state of a person's real property may be done only
after the state has afforded the person notice and an adequate hearing.
78
75. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (explaining
due process rights).
77. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 7.3.4 (1997) (noting that term "life," even if it were relevant in context of munici-
pal corporation standing, "in the due process clause is rarely the subject of
controversy").
78. See id. § 7.3 (noting lack of controversy caused by term "property" in Four-
teenth Amendment). It can also be argued that certain other rights and responsi-
bilities granted to municipal corporations through state legislation are also in the
nature of "property" interests, in the same way that statutory entitlements for indi-
viduals have been held to be property for purposes of the Due Process Clause. See
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (explaining that property inter-
ests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that indi-
viduals receiving welfare benefits have a "property interest" in continuing to re-
ceive those benefits, and that government must provide due process if it seeks to
withdraw those benefits); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 783-
87 (1964) (arguing that government entitlements constitute a form of "new prop-
erty" to which procedural due process protections should extend).
Given limiting statements by the Supreme Court on the matter of what consti-
tutes liberty and property for purposes of due process analysis and the ideological
leanings of the current Court, it seems unlikely that the Court would accept an
argument that a state's legislative grant to a municipal government of Home Rule
powers, for example, constitutes a "property" interest, the deprivation of which
must comply with procedural due process requirements. Cf Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (holding that employee's discharge was not deprivation of
property interest protected by Fourteenth Amendment). Nonetheless, this Article
asserts that procedural due process rights for municipalities should extend at least
to those indisputable property interests having nothing to do with substantive mat-
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Municipal corporations often own real property. As previously dis-
cussed, a distinction can be made between property held by the municipal
corporation in its governmental capacity as compared to that held in its
private, proprietary capacity.79 Some courts hold that:
[P] roperty of the first class is to be regarded as "public" property,
and hence not protected by the constitutional inhibition in ques-
tion, while property of the second class is as much "private" as
property of an individual landowner, with the result that it may
not be taken by another subdivision or agency of the state with-
out payment of just compensation.8 0
In other words, under this approach "the Fourteenth Amendment . . .
applies only to property held by a municipality in its proprietary capac-
ity."81 Accordingly, it must be so that a Fourteenth Amendment "property
interest" does indeed exist, and the state may deprive the municipality of
this interest only upon affording it due process of law.
3. What Sort of "Process" Is Due?
Under procedural due process analysis, once it is determined that the
state is attempting to deprive a "person" of a "life, liberty, or property"
interest, the Constitution requires, at a minimum, that the person have
the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."8 2 In conducting its inquiry, a court should consider three
factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
ters involving the state's internal political organization, with the full understanding
that most disputes between states and their municipalities probably do turn on
"substantive matters of internal political organization," and are therefore beyond
constitutional protection. For a discussion of a municipality's standing to sue, see
infra note 95 and accompanying text. Moreover, adequate process may well al-
ready be afforded through the legislative process, as discussed infra notes 92-94
and accompanying text.
79. For a discussion of the legal distinction between publicly-held and pri-
vately-held municipal property, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
80. Annotation, supra note 28, at 248 (indicating when state courts have given
protection to municipalities); see also supra note 42 (noting that this Article sup-
ports premise that only when state has procedurally deprived municipality of lib-
erty, property or other interest does municipality have standing to sue on
procedural grounds).
81. Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Comm. on Water Pollution, 50 N.W.2d
424, 436 (Wis. 1951). For support for the proposition that state interest with pro-
prietary nature must be reasonably compensated before it can be used by another
state agency, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
82. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). For a discussion of what minimum due process
is due under Fourteenth Amendment for property interest, see supra notes 59-60
and accompanying text.
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through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 83
In a case such as that posed in our hypothetical, where State seeks to
acquire real Property held by City in its private and proprietary capacity,
State should be expected to provide process similar to that which would be
afforded an individual person holding property that the government seeks
to acquire. In other words, courts should apply the three-factor Mathews v.
Eldridges4 test in determining whether the State's "process" passes constitu-
tional muster:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.8 5
In our hypothetical, City's "private" interest to hold and use Property
is a fundamental property right and weighs heavily in the Mathews balanc-
ing test.8 6 At the very least, if City has expended funds of its own to ac-
quire and develop Property to any significant extent, State's action can
have grave economic consequences for City. The risk of "erroneous depri-
vation" of City's property interest is great if the State is under no obliga-
tion to accord basic due process of law to the City any time State decides
that it wants City's property.87 Principles of fundamental fairness should
discourage states from trying to get "something for nothing"-even from
those noxious "creatures of the state."' 8 In addition, the "probable value"
of requiring State to observe basic principles of due process in a case
where it seeks to deprive City of property held in City's private and propri-
etary capacity is that such a requirement would give effect to the Supreme
Court's statement that "[1] egislative control of municipalities, no less than
any other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed
by the United States Constitution."8 9 The Court further stated that, "[t]he
83. Id. at 335.
84. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
85. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335 (articulating three-part test).
86. See id. at 335-39 (weighing private interest at risk).
87. Id. at 335 (noting that degree of potential deprivation must be considered
in assessing validity of administration's decision-making process).
88. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (stating that,
regardless of granted power, municipality remains "creature of the state").
89. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960). For a discussion of
the facts and resolution of Gomillion, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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State [does not have] plenary power to manipulate in every conceivable
way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal corpora-
tions . . . ."9 Moreover, long-recognized distinctions between property
held by municipal corporations in their governmental capacity and that
held in their private and proprietary capacity would be reemphasized by
an insistence on observing procedural due process in such circum-
stances. 9 1 Finally, requiring the State to accord procedural due process to
City might lead to marginally greater administrative and other costs for
State. 9 2 In the final analysis of the hypothetical, factors one and two of the
Mathews balancing test far outweigh factor three, leading to the natural
conclusion that the current process of denying municipal corporations
procedural due process protections from certain actions of their creating
states is unconstitutional. In sum, under Mathews, State must provide City
adequate procedural due process if it seeks to deprive City of property
held in City's private and proprietary capacity.
It should be observed that, lest an objection is raised that allowing
municipal corporations standing to pursue procedural due process claims
against their creating states would open the floodgates of litigation, in
many cases a strong argument can be made that the municipality already
receives the required procedural due process through the normal legisla-
tive process. 93 Specifically, the legislative process involves the opportunity
for debate among state legislators, some of whom represent the district
encompassing the municipal corporation. Under this argument, the inter-
ests of the municipality, therefore, are arguably adequately represented by
the political process, and the municipality in effect receives the necessary
"hearing" required under the Due Process Clause. 94
90. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344.
91. For a discussion of a municipality's standing to sue on due process
grounds, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
92. Cf Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (noting that financial cost alone is not "con-
trolling factor" in determining whether due process is met, but that court must
weigh government's interest). Additional costs for State would be payment ofjust
compensation to municipal corporations for the Property State takes from City.
To the extent that state statutory and constitutional provisions already require pay-
ment of just compensation, the act of imposing federal procedural due process re-
quirements does not in fact increase State's cost.
93. The balance would be tipped too far in favor of the municipality, the ar-
gument goes, if a municipality can assert that the state has deprived it of its right to
procedural due process any time the state legislature decides to withdraw, change,
or withhold a municipality's liberty or property interest. This is far from the case,
though, in our hypothetical case where State attempts to take Property held by City
in its private and proprietary capacity.
94. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915) (stating that "[g]eneral statutes within the state power are passed that affect
the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giv-
ing them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that
they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those
who make the rule.").
[Vol. 47: p. 93
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss1/3
2002] MUNICIPALITIES AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 115
Indeed, the legislative-process-as-adequate-hearing argument, when
combined with the state's authority to determine matters involving the
substance of its internal political organization free of constitutional con-
straint95 (and because the great majority of actions affecting municipal
corporations probably involve such matters), leads one to suppose that it
still may be the unusual case where the municipal corporation would be
able to argue successfully that its procedural due process rights have been
violated. Despite the fact that the end result likely would be the same
whether or not the municipality has standing-namely, the municipality
fails in its effort to overturn the state's action-the means used in coming
to that result are altogether different, and the distinction is of prime im-
portance in terms of the principles of doctrinal consistency and funda-
mental fairness.
In one case-where the municipal corporation does have standing to
bring the procedural due process claim-the municipality is properly rec-
ognized as a "person" able to assert certain procedural due process rights,
but which simply has not prevailed on the merits of procedural due pro-
cess analysis. This is a far cry from the alternative case-where the munici-
pal corporation has no standing-whereby the municipal corporation is
summarily denied any opportunity for judicial review regardless of the na-
ture or grievousness of the state's action. Again, the distinction in the
means used here make all the difference in whether the principles ofjus-
tice underlying the Due Process Clause are (or are not) being vindicated.
For purposes of doctrinal consistency, then, the approach advocated
in this Article-namely, that a municipality does have standing to pursue a
procedural due process claim when the creating state seeks to deprive the
municipality of a liberty or property interest not involving substantive mat-
ters of the state's internal political organization-is the preferred ap-
proach. This approach is also more in keeping with the notion that "It] he
essence of procedural due process is fundamental fairness." 96 Specifically,
notwithstanding the existence of state constitutional or statutory provi-
sions,9 7 it is important to the health and efficiency of state-local govern-
ment relations that the Due Process Clause require states to observe at
least minimal procedural requirements vis-,-vis their municipal corpora-
95. See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
United States Constitution does not limit state's ability to abolish or reorganize
political subdivision).
96. City and County of Denver v. Eggert, 647 P.2d 216, 224 (1982); see also
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (stating that "the right to be heard before being con-
demned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the
stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society")
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurther, J., concurring)); id. (stating that "[t] he fundamental requirement
of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner'") (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
97. For a discussion of state constitutional and statutory provisions, see supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
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tions. To accept less would sanction any impairment by a State of a munic-
ipal corporation's interests so long as it was cloaked in the garb of the line
of cases cited in South Macomb.98 As asserted by the Supreme Court in a
different context, "It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the
Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence." 99
IV. CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom holds that "a municipal corporation, in its own
right, receives no protection from the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses vis-dt-vis its creating state," 0° due to the municipality's historical
status as "a [mere] agency of the state."1 ' This Article argues, after a care-
ful examination of federal and state precedent involving standing for mu-
nicipal corporations to assert claims against their creating states, together
with a review of the United States Supreme Court's current procedural
due process doctrine, that such statements are overbroad, and that munic-
ipal corporations do in fact have standing to assert procedural due process
claims against their creating states in cases not involving substantive mat-
ters of the state's internal political organization. Judicial recognition of
this distinction would go a long way toward furthering principles of funda-
mental fairness and doctrinal consistency in state-local relations, and to-
ward according a measure of deserved respect to those constitutionally-
maligned "creatures of the state," municipal corporations.
98. See S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500,
504 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that relationship between public corporation and its
creating state has led court to conclude that municipal corporations cannot invoke
Fourteenth Amendment protection).
99. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (quoting Frost v. Frost
Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926)).
100. S. Macomb, 790 F.2d at 505. For a further discussion of the South Macomb
case, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
101. 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 2.08.
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